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Abstract 
This article examines the similarities between the Austrian research program and the 
complexity approach in economics. We argue that the Austrians, especially Hayek, an-
ticipated many topics addressed by the complexity approach. Besides investigating the 
extent to which complexity themes arise in the Austrian theories, we discuss the meth-
odological reasons for the affinity between the two theoretical traditions. After arguing 
that computational models could assist in resolving a dispute in the modern Austrian 
market process theory, we conclude the article with a Hayekian critique of certain as-
pects of the lock-in models developed by the complexity tradition.
Key-words: complexity, self-organization, Austrian school.
Resumen  
 
Este artículo examina las similitudes entre el programa de investigación austríaco y el 
enfoque moderno de la complejidad en economía. Argumentamos que los austríacos, 
especialmente Hayek, anticiparon muchos temas abordados por el enfoque de la com-
plejidad. Además de investigar el grado en que estas cuestiones surgen en las teorías 
austríacas, se discuten las razones metodológicas para la afinidad entre los dos enfoques. 
Después de argumentar que los modelos computacionales pueden ayudar a resolver una 
controversia en la moderna teoría del proceso de mercado de los austriacos, se conclu-
ye con una crítica de Hayek de ciertos aspectos de los modelos de lock-in desarrollados 
por el enfoque de la complejidad.
Palabras claves: complejidad, auto-organización, escuela austríaca.
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Introduction.
Though relatively unknown among economists, the science of complexity 
has been established as a research program able to provide explanations 
for phenomena that, although typically studied by disciplines in different 
fields of knowledge, share common elements, which justifies a unified 
treatment. Several examples of such phenomena, called self-organizing 
complex systems, are economic in nature, and therefore the study of this 
approach deserves closer inspection by economists.
Self-organizing structures present some typical properties: they evolve 
continually, often as adaptation to a changing environment, and some-
times they show apparent functionality, i.e., these structures appear to 
follow some purpose. Such structures are composed of elements whose 
principle of motion is not directly related to the global properties of the 
system, so that the whole has characteristics different from those pre-
sented by its parts. These elements behave according to relatively simple 
rules. Additionally, the interaction between the elements is local: each one 
relates to a relatively small number of elements in its neighborhood.
The ways in which bees stabilize the temperature of the hive (Miller and 
Page 2007, p.15); ants tend to maximize the distances between the col-
ony, the garbage dump and cemetery (Johnson 2002 p.24); and how the 
actions of humans are coordinated in markets—as well as the evolution of 
money, social norms, and language—are all examples that fit this descrip-
tion.
The problem facing students of these phenomena is to construct a theory 
that explains how a complex order spontaneously emerges from the inter-
action of simple elements. Any theory proposed to address the problem 
cannot assume an external element that controls the system from outside: 
the explanation must be bottom-up, from simple elements to the com-
plex structure itself.
The term “complexity” may seem inappropriate, contradicting the notion 
that all theory is a simplification. But we still use it because it refers to 
the idea that the central elements of complex phenomena are overlooked 
if we only apply analytical tools that use static models with overly aggre-
gated variables, because the emergent properties of complex phenomena 
are explained in terms of structural relationships among their elements.
This leads to an old methodological dilemma: drastic simplifications are 
criticized for their lack of realism, but to take into account the richness 
of different aspects of a phenomenon, as the historicist desires, leads to 
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a mass of data that defies understanding. The solution found by the com-
plexity approach (CA) to science is the use of computational models. 
These can represent systems composed of multiple heterogeneous agents 
that use simple rules and interact locally, resulting in the emergence of 
spontaneous orders. Although in these models the number of particular 
outcomes is virtually infinite, repetition of the simulations enables us to 
discern patterns or regularities in the behavior of those systems.
The study of complex systems has developed gradually over the twenti-
eth century. Several theories dealing with complex phenomena were de-
veloped, such as general systems theory (Bertalanffy 1969), cybernetics 
(Wiener 1948), and chaos theory. Due to its multidisciplinary nature, the 
study of complexity has collected contributions from various fields, such 
as mathematics, chemistry, evolutionary biology, and computer science, 
generating a diverse repertoire of techniques. In particular, the develop-
ment of computers allowed many programming techniques to be wide-
ly used in models, such as genetic algorithms (Holland 1992; Mitchell 
1998), employed, among other purposes, to represent learning processes 
of agents and cellular automata (Wolfram 1984), used to depict systems 
displaying local interactions.
Over time, it became clear that the different systems studied had common 
elements, which gave impetus to the search for a unified discipline.1 An 
important step in this task was taken by researchers at Santa Fe Institute 
in the United States, an interdisciplinary center focused on the study of 
complex adaptive systems.
The CA in economics, driven by this effort, models markets as adaptive 
systems in which over time (not statically), coordination patterns (not 
necessarily equilibria) emerge (it is not assumed) that show continuous 
adaptation to change (not optimality). These patterns are obtained by de-
centralized interaction (not coordinated by a Walrasian auctioneer) be-
tween heterogeneous agents (not by representative agents), with partial 
(not perfect) knowledge, the result of a learning process from which un-
anticipated results or novelty frequently arises. Additionally, agents act 
according to a set of rules (rather than maximization of known functions) 
(Arthur et.al. 1997). The agent-based computational models inspired by 
this tradition seek to represent many characteristics listed above.2
If economies are indeed complex adaptive systems as described by the CA, 
it would be natural to search through the history of economic thought for 
1 There are many good introductory books to the science of complexity:  Flake (1998), Miller 
and Page (2007), and Mitchell (2009).
2 For an introduction to computational models in economics, see Tesfatsion and Judd (2006).
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anticipations of this approach: the Smithian invisible hand metaphor is 
one easily identifiable example. However, the most striking example is 
found in the work of the Austrian economist F.A. Hayek. Reading the 
complexity literature provokes the feeling that we are indeed revisiting 
Austrian themes. This is attested by Brian Arthur, a researcher at the Santa 
Fe Institute:
Right after we published our first findings, we started getting let-
ters from all over the country saying, ‘You know, all you guys have 
done is rediscover Austrian economics’ ... I admit I wasn’t familiar 
with Hayek and von Mises at the time. But now that I’ve read them, 
I can see that this is essentially true.” (Tucker 1996)
As it often happens in any history of ideas, in seeking precursors we run 
the risk of “Whig history”. This article, whose object of study is the rela-
tionship between the Austrian school (AS) and the complexity approach 
to economics, seeks to show that this danger is small in relation to the 
Austrian writers, insofar as the central themes of the CA are effectively 
present in several Austrian theories.
To show the affinity between the two approaches, we initially examine 
Menger’s theory of the evolution of money and Böhm-Bawerk’s develop-
ment of Austrian capital theory. After that, we show that complexity is a 
central feature of the problem that defines Hayek’s research program. In 
order to establish this, we must first examine his article explicitly dealing 
with the appropriate methodology for the study of complex phenomena. 
Next, we discuss the role of complexity in some of his theories. This ex-
ercise will demonstrate that Hayek constructs a worldview that progres-
sively becomes more evolutionary and compatible with the CA.
After showing that the Austrians anticipated themes developed by the 
complexity approach to economics (or that the latter incorporated Austri-
an themes), we argue that the CA can be useful for discussing the contro-
versy about the preponderance of (dis)equilibrating forces in the market 
process theory developed by the next generation of Austrian economists. 
After suggesting that the Austrians should pay more attention to the mod-
els developed by the CA, we conclude by arguing that the proponents of 
CA can also learn from a closer study of the Austrian School.
Complexity among the Austrians: from Menger to Mises.
Many of the characteristics found in the computational models of com-
plexity science have been present in the Austrian school since its begin-
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nings. The clearest example of this is given by the Mengerian theory of 
the evolution of money (Menger 1892). As agents realize that the accep-
tance of a liquid good as payment allows more advantageous exchanges, 
circumventing the need for a double coincidence of wants, the good be-
comes more liquid, which increases its value as a medium of exchange. 
This occurs until that good becomes the currency, without this having 
been planned by anyone.
Countering the accusation made in the Methodenstreit that economics ig-
nores history and institutions, Menger’s theory offers an explanation that 
is both theoretical (it uses, for instance, the hypothesis of self-interested 
agents) and accounts for the emergence and evolution in time of an in-
stitution, money. This explanation, an example of what is now called a 
network externality, includes both the phenomenon of path dependence, 
since different goods could become money, and the emergence of self-
organization, obtained as a non-intentional consequence of the local in-
teraction of agents during a learning process.
The presence of typical complexity themes in the beginning of the AS is not 
accidental. The main reason for this is as follows: while the other strands of 
the marginalist revolution, by adopting the mathematical formalism avail-
able at the time, were forced to ignore the themes developed by CA in 
their models, the Austrians, whose theories were expressed verbally, were 
free to discuss the matter. In fact, the formalization of economics during 
the twentieth century favored analyses involving aggregate variables re-
lated by equations whose simultaneous solution generated descriptions of 
equilibria, ignoring possible structural relationships between elements of 
such aggregates, while the methodological assumptions accepted by the 
Austrians did not reject verbal arguments for describing these relation-
ships. This non-mathematical style of reasoning allowed Menger to use 
genetic-causal explanations rather than search for functional relationships 
between aggregate variables (Mayer 1995). This methodological choice is 
related to the consistent adherence to the principle of methodological in-
dividualism that we find in Menger. The same occurs in the work of Mises 
(1998), especially regarding the development of the Austrian theory of 
the market process, with its emphasis on entrepreneurial action out of 
equilibrium in an environment of uncertainty.
Features like uncertainty, learning, adaptability, and relationships between 
heterogeneous agents, fundamental to the understanding of real market 
phenomena, thus tended to disappear from formal neoclassical theory, 
though they survived in the Austrian tradition. We had to wait for the 
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modern development of computational models that allow the formaliza-
tion of some of these market characteristics so that the Austrians’ themes 
could be revived—hence the similarity between the two approaches.
The inability to represent phenomena through aggregate variables, whose 
interest lies in their structure, is an example of the limitation of the for-
malism of the period and can be illustrated by the capital theory devel-
oped by Böhm-Bawerk (1959). The distinctive feature of this theory is the 
heterogeneity of capital. Production is represented by the author through 
continuous-imput/point-output processes, in which capital goods are 
transformed by the addition of other factors of production until they ma-
ture in the form of nondurable consumer goods. Capital is described as 
a structure whose elements are heterogeneous, since they are situated 
at different stages of the process. Increasing productivity through invest-
ment is associated with the adoption of an increasingly complex capital 
structure. Investment is not seen as obtaining more of the same equip-
ment, but as the adoption of more specific capital goods, that fills the gaps 
in an increasingly differentiated structure.
Capital seen as a structure poses a number of interesting problems, since 
heterogeneity implies that changes in this structure, in a growth scenario 
or during economic cycles, cause production rigidities: time is needed for 
the capital structure to reorganize. The processes that occur during this 
transition period will be at the center of what has become Austrian mac-
roeconomics, developed by Hayek. For our purposes, it suffices to note 
that certain phenomena, such as the distortions in this structure caused by 
different economic policies, cannot be studied by usual macroeconomic 
theory, given the degree of aggregation of its variables. Moreover, the dif-
ficulty in formally representing the capital structure is demonstrated by 
Böhm-Bawerk’s failed attempt to use a scalar to measure a multidimen-
sional structure - the average period of production.
The second reason for complexity becoming a common theme among the 
Austrians, especially in Mises and later in Hayek, is related to the opin-
ions these authors held in policy debates. The classical Liberalism of the 
Austrians made their contributions to controversies emphasize those as-
pects of reality that were left out of the theoretical simplifications used as 
bases for the instruments of intervention proposed by their opponents. 
Both the ability to stabilize the economy with the use of macroeconomic 
policies and the possibility of central planning using the theory of general 
equilibrium -the latter suggested during the socialist economic calcula-
tion debate- were rejected because of the excessively aggregate character 
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of macro theory and over static character of micro theory. As a result, the 
Austrians proposed theories that portray the economy as a self-organizing 
system whose complexity precludes the central control of its details. 
Complexity in Hayek: methodological aspects.
Although we can identify, prior to Hayek, several similarities between 
the AS and CA, only in that author can we recognize a genuine forerun-
ner of the modern study of complex systems. His theories progressively 
incorporate evolutionary elements and explicitly treat social phenomena 
as complex self-organizing systems, in contrast to the mechanistic models 
of the economy that prevailed in the twentieth century. Indeed, Hayek’s 
concern with complex adaptive systems resulted in the clash between his 
theories and the research programs dominant in his era, as witnessed by 
the frequent debates in which the author was involved.
This is due in part to methodological peculiarities inherent to the study of 
complex phenomena, alien to the methodological canons inspired by the 
physical sciences professed by most economists. It is therefore natural that 
Hayek should address the methodological aspect of the study of complex 
phenomena, as we find in his The Theory of Complex Phenomena (Hayek 
1967a).
In this text, Hayek begins his analysis with the identification of structures, 
called patterns, which show some regularity when taken as a whole, 
despite having elements that vary in each instance of the pattern. Sci-
ence must then distinguish between predictions of specific settings for a 
particular pattern and predictions of general characteristics of the type 
of pattern. This distinction becomes crucial when the patterns are com-
plex. Hayek defines complexity as “the minimum number of elements 
of which an instance of the pattern must consist in order to exhibit all 
the characteristic attributes of that class of patterns in question,” (Hayek 
1967a, p. 25) or “the minimum number of distinct variables a formula or 
model must possess in order to reproduce the characteristic patterns of 
structures of different fields (or to exhibit the general laws which these 
structures obey)” (Hayek 1967a, p. 26). Unlike classical physics, with its 
precise laws involving only a few variables, when we move to the biologi-
cal and social phenomena, the degree of complexity necessarily increases. 
In such cases, it is impossible to observe all the initial conditions necessary 
to forecast particular configurations of complex patterns. It is impossible 
here to obtain the accuracy found in the study of simpler phenomena. 
However, it would still be possible to make pattern predictions of broader 
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characteristics of the phenomenon.
The theories about these phenomena are seen by Hayek as “algebraic theo-
ries”, since it is not possible, for the reason given above, to replace the 
variables of the model with observed data. These theories would then have 
lower empirical content than theories about simpler phenomena. Hayek 
(Hayek 1967a, p. 29) then defends a modified version of the philosophy 
of his friend Popper: although we should make theories as falsifiable as 
possible, the greater the complexity of the subject matter, the necessarily 
lower the degree of falsifiability of the theory. This is the price to pay for 
the study of complex phenomena.
The attempt to force the study of these patterns using the methodological 
standards of the physical sciences - what Hayek (1979) called “scientism” 
- prevents complex phenomena from being recognized as such. Statistics, 
for example, tends to eliminate complexity and treats the elements of a 
pattern as independent from each other, favoring homogeneous quantities 
and ignoring the connections and relative positions of the elements of the 
complex structure, which may be at the heart of the explanation of these 
phenomena.
The theory of evolution, Walrasian general equilibrium, and Chomsky´s 
linguistics are presented as examples of theories about complex phenom-
ena. Just as the theory of evolution can explain the past but not predict 
details of the future, due to the profusion of unknown factors that affect 
the reproductive capacity of organisms, Walrasian theory should also be 
seen as an algebraic theory, which explains only some general principles 
about the economy’s function instead of a usable tool for predicting spe-
cific values of the variables.
It is clear from these arguments that computational agent-based models 
are compatible with the methodology proposed by Hayek for the study 
of complex phenomena. These models circumvent the inability to obtain 
the infinite data concerning real complex patterns by creating artificial 
worlds in which we can investigate the structural relations between ele-
ments and, by repeating the simulations with diverse initial conditions, 
discern regularities and make pattern predictions about the behavior of 
these phenomena in the real world.
Complexity in Hayek: the coordination problem.
Hayek’s methodological concern with complexity wasn´t just a passing 
interest, but a sign of the greater role that complexity plays in his theories. 
We can discern a theme throughout his work that unifies his theoretical 
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system, having at its center the concept of complexity. This theme is de-
fined by the search for explanations for the emergence of coordinated ac-
tions by individuals, whose limited knowledge precludes them from over-
coming, by means of conscious control, the complexity of the problem 
of coordination.3 This complexity, requiring a learning mechanism, will 
be present in several of the author’s theories, as we shall see. From the 
beginning of his career until the early 1940s, Hayek (1935; 1939; 1941) 
developed the Austrian theory of capital and business cycles.4 Although 
they don´t make explicit references to complexity, these theories treat 
macro-phenomena as complex, thus presenting the methodological pecu-
liarities just discussed.
The Austrian theory of business cycles, the main rival of the Keynesian 
explanation for the economic crisis in the 1930s, soon fell into disrepute. 
One reason for this was methodological. The prevailing Positivism favored 
theories that employed variables with a high degree of aggregation and the 
absence of structural relations between components, so that they could 
be related by algebraic formulae and be empirically tested. Hayek, on the 
other hand, because of his belief that the correct macroeconomic explana-
tion involved a higher degree of complexity, used structural relationships 
in place of aggregates and for that reason had to employ fewer operational 
concepts. As his theory allowed only some general pattern predictions, it 
could not be represented by an econometrically testable model.
In fact, his theory described the distortions of the capital structure re-
sulting from changes in relative prices, which depended on the specific 
markets in which the monetary injections occurred (a local interaction 
the author called “Cantillon effect”). While economists in the twenties, 
using the aggregation level typical of the equation of exchange, saw no 
danger in increases in the money stock while this was offset by greater 
productivity that left the price level stable, Hayek considered money to 
be non-neutral even at a constant price level, given the distortions caused 
by relative prices changes.
The rejection of greater complexity implicit in this theory is confirmed by 
the nature of the controversies in which its author was involved. Repeat-
ing the debate between Clark and Böhm-Bawerk, Frank Knight criticized 
Hayek, denying the importance of the temporal dimension of capital. 
Hayek (1936) in turn criticized the Knightian conception of capital as a 
3 In the same way, O’Driscoll (1977), identifies the problem of coordination as a central theme 
in the work of Hayek. Hayek himself, in the preface of this work, agrees with this characteriza-
tion.
4 For a modern presentation of that theory, see Garrison (2000).
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homogeneous fund that yields perpetual service. The temporal dimension 
in fact disappears in a steady state, where all stages of a production process 
are produced simultaneously; while on occasions that involve change, the 
temporal dimension of the structure of capital matters again, and thus 
capital cannot be represented as a homogeneous variable.
Further elaborating this theory, Hayek (1939) emphasizes the importance 
of the heterogeneity of capital. He criticizes, for example, the belief that 
investments always reduce the return on additional investment: if capital 
is heterogeneous, certain investments generate more demand for com-
plementary investments, thereby increasing interest. It would be inap-
propriate to therefore assume a simple relationship between interest and 
investment without studying the morphology of capital. Kaldor (1942), 
on the other hand, considers changes in the capital structure over the 
cycle, –dubbed the “concertina effect”– to be empirically unimportant.
Besides these controversies, whose roots lie in the contrast between 
homogenous aggregates and concepts that describe structures, Hayek’s 
(1941) attempt to develop the theory of capital in order to represent the 
complexity of its structure in richer form did not generate satisfactory 
results, testament to the difficulty of the task. This is an avenue of research 
on the AS that could be helped by the type of modeling used by the CA. 
Perhaps some aspects of the pattern of connections between the elements 
of the structure of capital could be represented as networks in computer 
models.
Disputes about business cycles and central planning led Hayek in the 
1930s to investigate the meaning of equilibrium and competition. The re-
sult of this research was the development of a theory that, as we shall see, 
in many ways coincides with the characterization of markets made by the 
complexity approach to economics, so that the meaning of Arthur´s state-
ment quoted at the beginning of this article can be readily understood.
In the first of a series of articles on the subject, Hayek (1937) exposes 
the need for a theory that explains the tendency toward equilibrium. The 
latter is defined as a situation in which the plans of all agents in a given 
period of time are mutually compatible. In equilibrium, each plan must 
contain correct information about the planned action of the others, which 
depends in part on the subjective expectations corresponding to the set 
of external facts. Unlike the plan of a single agent, whose elements are 
defined subjectively in his mind, the plans of several agents that interact 
will initially contain erroneous information about the behavior of oth-
ers, in addition to divergent views on aspects of reality. The equilibrium 
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theory seeks to circumvent the difficulty arising from the incompatibility 
of plans by supposing, through the assumption of perfect knowledge, that 
the data concerning the allocative problem are seen the same way by ev-
eryone. Thus, the question of the emergence of equilibrium, starting from 
an initial situation of discoordination, does not arise, and is reduced to a 
tautological problem of allocating given means to known ends.
Hayek, however, believes that economic theory is not a mere tautology, 
because empirically we observe some order and not chaos in markets, 
and for that reason there is a tendency toward equilibrium. To explain 
its emergence, we cannot avoid the task of determining under what con-
ditions (and how) the subjective data approach (or not) underlying re-
ality. A theory is then needed to explain how agents learn, to describe 
how their knowledge, initially divergent and erroneous, is corrected and 
spontaneously generates an organized order in a manner that could only 
be replicated consciously by some central organ possessing all informa-
tion (Hayek 1937, p. 50). We thus reach the problem we call the unifying 
theme of Hayek’s work, namely: to determine how to circumvent the 
limitation of knowledge in order to overcome the inherent complexity of 
the task of coordinating individual plans.
The answer to this problem involves the use of a mechanism that allows 
multiple actions and is subject to an error correction process. The learn-
ing process in Hayek’s theory can thus be described as a mechanism of 
evolution by variation and selection,5 as he detailed in later articles.
In one of those articles, Hayek (1945) shows that the problem of lim-
ited knowledge is solved with the help of the price system. This acts as a 
mechanism for the transmission of information that eliminates the need 
for knowledge of the details of the allocative problem. An agent does not 
need to know the various causes of the need to save some input, but he 
does so nevertheless due to the variations in prices. The revealed profit-
ability of the projects induces corrections of knowledge and plans.
The adjustments, however, are not perfect (Hayek 1945, p. 527), and in-
stead of an equilibrium we have only a tendency toward it. To understand 
the importance of the signaling role of prices out of equilibrium, it is 
important to emphasize the distinction that Hayek (1945, p. 521) makes 
between the scientific knowledge of the economists and the particular 
knowledge of the agent. The first is generic, shared by scientists, whereas 
the latter refers to the “particular circumstances of time and place” that 
5 Up to this point, evolutionism is latent. Later, as we shall see, the evolutionary approach is 
explicit.
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each individual faces. For Hayek, the latter type is relevant to the alloca-
tive problem. This dramatically increases the complexity of the coordina-
tion problem we face in markets. We must then explain how knowledge 
of the system’s details, constantly changing, is transmitted via local inter-
action between agents. Or, in the words of the author, “... the economic 
problem of society is largely a problem of rapid adaptation to changes in 
the particular circumstances of time and place.” (Hayek 1945, pg. 524)
The economic problem thus formulated brings us to the Hayekian critique 
of the theory of perfect competition (Hayek 1980 [1946]). This theory, by 
focusing exclusively on the final state of equilibrium, ignores the essential 
characteristics of the competitive process (Hayek 1980 [1946], p. 101), 
without which coordination in the market would not be possible. When 
activities commonly associated with competition by common sense—
such as product variation, brand fidelity, advertising, or promotional pric-
ing—are viewed with suspicion by the theory, certain policies that aim to 
increase competition by blocking these activities involve a petition princi-
pii. In the absence of the competitive rivalry between entrepreneurs, what 
is considered by the theory as given would not exist at all. In other words, 
if agents’ knowledge is fallible, a trial and error learning mechanism is 
necessary, but this discovery procedure would be blocked by policies in-
formed by a theory that assumes knowledge as given from the start.
“Competition as a discovery procedure” is exactly the title of the next 
article we will consider (Hayek 1978). In this article the author combines 
his theory of market process with the study of self-organizing systems, 
articulating his evolutionary approach. The definition of the fundamental 
problem of economics as the allocation of given means to known ends, 
compatible with a vision in which this problem could be solved conscious-
ly as an engineering problem is contrasted with the notion of spontane-
ous order (Hayek 1978, p. 258), according to which the emergence of 
coordination in the markets is not the result of the intention of any of its 
participants. The equilibrium concept, which implies that competition has 
ceased and knowledge is given, is replaced by the notion of order, which 
can be approximated even in an environment characterized by continuous 
change, by means of the negative feedback mechanism provided by the 
price system, which generates learning and partial compatibility of plans.6
In this learning process the emergence of novelty plays a central role. For 
Hayek, if data relative to the particular circumstances of time and place 
were indeed previously known, competition would be useless. Competi-
6 In this text, Hayek (p. 259) acknowledges Smith with his invisible hand metaphor as a precur-
sor of  the study of self-organizing systems.
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tion is justified precisely because we do not know in advance the facts that 
determine the actions of competitors, i.e., to the extent that competition 
generates a discovery process.
A methodological consequence of this discussion is that, because it is im-
possible to determine what will be discovered by competitive process, 
the theory of competition should be limited to pattern prediction—the 
description of the more general aspects of learning processes, rather than 
predictions about particular instances of competition.
Another consequence concerns the assessment of market performance. 
Since it is impossible to anticipate the fruits of the discovery process, there 
is no way to operationalize an ex ante measure of performance. Addition-
ally, the concept of Pareto optimality, applicable to states of equilibria, 
overlooks the discovery function of markets. Actual markets should thus 
be compared with other concrete institutional arrangements in terms of 
capacity, starting from an initial situation of relative ignorance, to gen-
erate learning and consequent adaptation to change, and should not be 
evaluated by a criterion that compares the real world with an unattain-
able abstract standard of perfect coordination, which assumes as given 
the knowledge that in fact results from the activity of competition out of 
equilibrium neglected by the theory.
The Hayekian characterization of the economy as a complex phenom-
enon, which emerges from the local interaction of individuals with fal-
lible and local knowledge and that nevertheless results in some degree 
of coordination made possible by an error correction mechanism, invites 
the development of the study of the limits of human knowledge and also 
the investigation of the institutions that help to overcome these limits. 
Hayek’s interests, from the 1950s onward, exceed the limits of pure 
economic theory, supplementing his understanding of the markets with 
theories about the evolution of institutions and psychological and philo-
sophical theories about the nature of human knowledge. In these theories 
complex systems also occupy a leading role.7
Throughout the second half of his career, Hayek gives increasing impor-
tance to the notion of spontaneous order. In a work published in the same 
7 Hayek (1976) is recognized as a pioneer of connectionist theory of mind. In this theory, mental 
phenomena are explained by the paths that impulses caused by sensory stimuli take in a network 
of nerve fibers. As with his other theories, here too Hayek describes a self-organizing system. 
The mind is seen as an emergent phenomenon, made from a material base, but which presents 
different characteristics from the elements of this base. The formation of an organized order 
is obtained through evolutionary processes. Again, the essence of the explanation involves re-
lationships between structural elements that interact locally. This structure adapts as it comes 
into contact with external stimuli, involves a learning process, and emphasizes the limitations 
of knowledge.
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year as his theory of mind, Hayek (1979, p. 70) uses as an example of 
this type of order the way forest trails are formed from individual deci-
sions about which route to take. Each decision takes into account both 
the desired destination and the lower costs of using a path already cleared 
by previous travelers. The interaction between agents generates, through 
a feedback process, the formation of tracks that were not the intention 
of any particular agent. Phenomena of this nature, to the author, are fre-
quent in social contexts8, although relatively little studied from this point 
of view. Unlike trails or other physical and biological examples, complex 
patterns in economics are not observable, only their concrete elements: 
we can observe firms and individuals, but the coordination pattern result-
ing from their interaction forms an abstract order. Scientism, defined in 
the same book as the imitation in social sciences of positivism which is 
mistakenly believed to represent the method employed in the physical 
sciences, focuses only on what can be observed and measured, in this way 
limiting the recognition of spontaneous order in society, which is the sub-
ject of the Hayekian theory of institutional evolution, which we consider 
next (Hayek 1978b; 1982; 1988).
In this theory, just as in the theory of market process, abstract social or-
ders are recognized by the compatibility of plans, i.e. the correspondence 
between expectations about the actions of agents and the actions actually 
performed (Hayek 1982, p. 36). Hayek classifies social orders into two 
types: those generated exogenously by the conscious creation of organiza-
tions, and those that emerge endogenously through evolutionary process-
es that result in spontaneous orders. In the latter category we have those 
fruits of human action but not of human design, such as language, social 
norms, and markets.
The first type, called taxis (Hayek 1982, p. 37), comprises simple and 
directly observable orders. Because they were created deliberately, they 
have specific purposes. The second type, cosmos, instead comprises usual-
ly complex and abstract orders that serve no specific purpose. For Hayek 
(1982, p.38), although spontaneous orders are not necessarily complex, 
only by this kind of order can one obtain structures with a high degree of 
complexity.
This brings us back to the author’s central problem, the investigation of 
how to overcome the limitation of agents’ knowledge in the face of the 
8 Also in his work as a historian of ideas, Hayek rescues the notions of spontaneous order and 
evolution present in social sciences, particularly in the Scottish Enlightenment authors such as 
Smith, Mandeville, and Ferguson. Hayek (1967b) frequently borrows from Ferguson the phrase 
“the results of human action but not of human intention” to characterize the concept of sponta-
neous order in society.
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complexity inherent to the task of coordinating their actions. Hayek´s an-
swer to this problem—which in the theory of market process consists of 
the study of how the price system helps to correct erroneous business 
assumptions—here is transformed into a generalized theory of learn-
ing by trial and error, belonging to the tradition known as evolutionary 
epistemology.9 Hayek (1982, ch. 1), in tune with this tradition, distin-
guishes between constructivist (or Cartesian) rationalism and evolution-
ary rationalism, analogously to the Popperian distinction between naive 
and critical rationalism. Constructivist rationalism accepts as reasonable 
only what is demonstrable. When applied to the sphere of human action, 
it tends to legitimize only those social orders based on conscious control 
(taxis), rejecting the spontaneous orders (cosmos) as irrational. Evolu-
tionary rationalism, on the other hand, believes that this position ignores 
the limitations of human knowledge. The demand for conscious control of 
social processes, because it considers only formal and abstract knowledge, 
excludes the use of agents’ practical and local knowledge, thus drasti-
cally limiting the complexity of the order which can be obtained in this 
manner (Hayek 1982, p. 13). Additionally, Hayek (1988, p. 71) derives 
from evolutionary rationalism the conclusion that even formal knowledge 
cannot have its potential usefulness justified a priori, since its logical con-
sequences cannot be completely anticipated. The program of constructiv-
ist rationalism would thus not be feasible, and true rationalism should 
take into account the consequences of the fallible and limited character 
of knowledge.
Historically, the growth in the use of knowledge in society has not de-
pended on progressive conscious control, but on the evolution of rules 
and institutions that have generated, as an unintended consequence, pro-
cesses of learning through error correction mechanisms, consistent with 
the fallible nature of knowledge.
The interaction of agents possessing limited knowledge in a complex en-
vironment then leads the author to consider—along with maximizing ac-
tion—rule-based action, as the CA would later do. Hayek (1982, p.13) 
makes the case that most of the rules of conduct that guide human action, 
as well as the institutions that arise from the use of these rules, are adapta-
tions to the impossibility of consciously taking into account all particular 
9 Evolutionary epistemology, which includes among others the ideas of Popper and Hayek, em-
phasizes the fallible character of knowledge, identifying rationality with the use of mechanisms 
of learning by trial and error, in a fashion similar to natural selection in the theory of evolution. 
For an introduction, see Radnitzky and Bartley (1987). Hayek (1978b; 1982) develops a theory 
consistent with this doctrine, though only in his last book (Hayek 1988) do we find explicit 
references to it.
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facts relevant to choice.
Hayek (1982, p. 44) noted, as modern students of complexity would lat-
er verify, that interactions under most conceivable types of rules do not 
result in orders or complex self-organized patterns. The adaptability of 
existing rules of action is then explained by the author as the result of 
an evolutionary process of selection of rules. Unsympathetic to sociobi-
ology, Hayek emphasizes the differences between cultural and biological 
evolution. In the former, rules are transmitted culturally, not genetically 
inherited from parents. The fundamental difference, however, lies in the 
selective mechanism. Given the assumption of limited knowledge, the 
author does not believe that the best rules are imitated due to recogni-
tion of their usefulness: although conscious about its lack of plausibility 
in biological terms, Hayek (1982, p.18, p. 44; 1988, p. 25) believes that 
cultural evolution occurs largely through a kind of group selection: societ-
ies whose members have adopted certain rules tend to grow and displace 
other groups.
Although noting that certain rules are the result of spontaneous evolution 
and not planning, Hayek (1988, pp. 17-20) states that his evolutionism 
does not imply progress. In fact, the morality that evolved in tribal so-
cieties presupposes an agreement on the part of its members, about the 
objectives pursued and the means to get them, that it is inconsistent with 
the prevailing impersonal rules of interaction existing in modern societ-
ies, marked by a high degree division of labor. The persistence of this tribal 
morality is an example of dysfunctional evolutionary heritage.
Nor does recognition of their evolutionary origin imply that rules should 
necessarily be spontaneous (Hayek 1982, p. 45). Mankind can improve 
rules, and Hayek presented a set of institutional reform proposals along 
with his theory of social evolution. The spontaneous nature of the rules 
should not be confused with their ability to preserve spontaneous orders 
in society (Hayek 1982, p. 51). While general rules of conduct would be 
consistent with the abstract character of these orders, specific commands 
that prevent agents from using local knowledge based on their own deci-
sions reduce their complexity. As in the theory of market process, here 
too freedom is advocated as a way to generate the diversity of actions 
necessary for the growth of fallible knowledge through a process of trial 
and error.
In this theory, once again, we find elements in common with the CA, 
especially the study of self-organization obtained through evolutionary 
processes for the interaction of rule-following individuals under limited 
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rationality. From our brief examination of some of the theories devel-
oped by Hayek, we can conclude that complexity is a recurrent theme, 
for it occupies a central role in the research program of the author, whose 
main problem is to explain how the progressive complexity required for 
coordination of the activities of agents with limited knowledge is made 
possible by the adoption of mechanisms of learning by variation and error 
correction.
Hayek’s difficulty in formally representing complex structures, so central 
to his thinking, explains how the modern CA in economics, when repre-
senting such structures in computer models, has revived various topics 
discussed by the Austrians. Nevertheless, subsequent generations of Aus-
trian economists will not be part of the multidisciplinary effort that led 
to the consolidation of CA, partly due to the Austrian rejection of formal 
modeling. Still, the similarities between the two approaches remain, and 
as we will argue in the next section, there are certain insights pertaining 
to CA that could be used in a Neoaustrian theory of market process.
Complexity in Lachmann and Kirzner: the theory of market 
process.
The Misesian view of economics as the science of human action, together 
with the Hayekian analysis of equilibrium and competition, laid the foun-
dation for the modern Austrian theory of market process developed by 
Lachmann and Kirzner.
Kirzner, like the modern students of complexity, does not assume the ex-
istence of equilibrium but rather seeks an explanation for its emergence. 
Using the Misesian notion of purposeful human action, Kirzner (1973) 
builds his theory of market process from the rejection of neoclassical no-
tion of maximizing agents. In the Kirznerian view, the agent’s structure of 
means and ends is not given, but its discovery is part of the problem faced 
by them. Kirzner thus posits the existence of another economic agent, the 
entrepreneur, whose function is the discovery of hitherto unnoticed ex-
change opportunities. These opportunities are not automatically realized 
and exploited in the market, but depend on the alertness of entrepreneurs 
who actively seek them.
Unlike neoclassical firms, which differ from each other only by the set of 
information they know, the Kirznerian entrepreneurs do not possess the 
same and correct model of the situation necessary to maximize expected 
profit. They must first, out of equilibrium, perceive profit opportunities; 
competition in a market depends on the rivalry between entrepreneurs 
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that sets in motion a form of Hayekian discovery process, in which en-
trepreneurial activity plays an equilibrating role, because the knowledge 
of the agents gradually approaches the real economic fundamentals that 
define the profit opportunities if no further change occurs.
Lachmann, in turn, takes Hayek’s work on learning and equilibrium as his 
starting point, but in the specific context of the Austrian theory of capi-
tal. Because in this theory production involves time, agents continually 
face plan revisions that must adapt the uses of the capital structure inher-
ited from the past. Initially, Lachmann (1956) believed that those revised 
plans can become consistent with each other through the mechanism of 
error correction provided by the price system. In later works, however, 
Lachmann (1986) gradually abandoned this belief in the usefulness of the 
concept of equilibrium. As future knowledge cannot be anticipated in the 
present (Popper 1957), the future is necessarily uncertain and business 
expectations are never certain knowledge. Nevertheless, as he puts it, al-
though the future cannot be known, it can be imagined. We therefore have 
different expectations held by different agents, expectations that guide 
individual plans and are a source of the continuous flux of novelties that 
prevent an equilibrium from being reached. The “radical subjectivism” of 
Lachmann, i.e. his belief in indeterminism generated by expectations, led 
the author to emphasize the creative aspect of competitive activity and 
criticize the vision of the market as a passive mechanism of adjustment to 
external changes.
The works of Kirzner and Lachmann gave rise to a controversy among 
the Austrians about the preponderance of equilibrating or disequilibrating 
forces in the market process. By emphasizing subjective elements, such as 
creative but fallible entrepreneurial knowledge, the Austrians were able 
to depart from the mechanistic model of competition offered by Neoclas-
sical theory, treating the economy as out of equilibrium and showing the 
importance of diversity of opinions for competition to result in a process 
of error correction. But with the radical subjectivism and rejection of the 
notion of equilibrium, the Austrian tradition risked denying any regularity 
in the markets and thus falling into a kind of historicism. How could they 
avoid this?
The answer was given by Garrison (1982). For this author, the Austri-
an School should occupy an intermediate position between neoclassical 
theory, which treats the economy as if it were always in equilibrium, and 
radical subjectivism, which treats the economy as if equilibrium had no 
importance at all. What makes this intermediate position defensible is rec-
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ognition of the existence of the underlying realities in the market process. 
By underlying realities, Garrison understands preferences, the individual 
endowments of goods, and availability of resources and technologies. The 
nexus between underlying realities and subjective actions occurs through 
a mechanism of selection of the latter in view of the existence of the for-
mer. Although such fundamentals do not determine the beliefs of agents, 
they serve as limitations.
As suggested by Garrison, the AS until now occupied an intermediate 
position between theories that treat human action as mechanical and pre-
determined on one side, or purely creative, without limitations imposed 
by the real world, on the other. How can the Austrian research program 
be advanced in this center oriented direction? We believe that a solution to 
this problem is offered by the affinities between the AS and CA, especially 
with regard to agent-based models that contain evolutionary learning pro-
cesses. In these models we find a diversity of opinions and actions on the 
part of agents, and a mechanism that punishes mistakes and rewards opin-
ions that make actions consistent with each other and with the economic 
fundamentals.
As we seek a balanced vision of the market process that encompasses both 
the subjectivism and indeterminism stressed by Lachmann and the er-
ror correction mechanism proposed by Kirzner, we could advance the 
Austrian theory of the market process. In evolutionary models of CA, the 
recognition of the realities underlying the market and the explicitation of 
a selection mechanism allow us to affirm the existence of equilibrating 
forces regardless of the accuracy of agents’ knowledge. It is not enough 
to point to the fragility of this knowledge; equilibrating forces do not 
depend on certain knowledge. There may be order without omniscience, 
provided there is a mechanism, however imperfect, of error correction. 
The hypothesis that survives the process may not reliably represent real-
ity, but at least those most inconsistent with the restrictions imposed by 
reality are eliminated.
Regarding the typical elements of the theory of evolution, Kirzner’s work 
represents selection in the face of the underlying realities, while the work 
of Lachmann represents recombination and mutation, the variability of 
individual interpretations and actions. In our opinion, the evolutionary 
interpretation of AS allows a synthesis of the thought of Lachmann and 
Kirzner. If we join both in one evolutionary process, we can harness the 
positive aspects of both authors, avoiding their weaknesses.
The advantages of the rapprochement between Austrian and evolutionary 
Filo Econ (2013) 1: 47-6966
CIECE
thought were perceived by some authors familiar with the theory of the 
market process, such as Langlois (1994) and Witt (1992). Both advocate 
the adoption of evolutionary models of market process.10 One of the chal-
lenges of this approach, as Witt noticed, is the difficulty of incorporat-
ing Austrian subjectivism into evolutionary models: these restrict a priori 
what may be devised by variation, so that the creative element stressed by 
Lachmann tends to be overlooked in these models, although this creativity 
appears in the form of mutations and recombinations of preprogrammed 
solutions. We will explore, in the final section, a concrete example of 
this difficulty in representing the creative element of the market process 
through the typical complexity models.
A Hayekian Critique of Complexity Models.
Having established the affinities between the CA and AS, we now consider 
a difference between them, arising from Hayek´s methodological work 
on the study of complex phenomena. From that methodological point of 
view, agent-based computational models developed by the CA should be 
understood only as explanations of the general principles of operation of 
the phenomena studied, not their specific configurations. However, these 
models sometimes seem to be employed in a manner inconsistent with 
this methodological viewpoint.
Take, for example, the discussion of lock-in in inferior technologies. In 
models in which agents with bounded rationality learn by trial and er-
ror—groping in their neighborhood in an n-dimensional space of possibil-
ities, with every move in this neighborhood evaluated by its performance 
(fitness)—it is possible that, depending on the starting point, the learning 
process may lock us into a solution that is just a local maximum in the 
fitness surface, preventing the efficient equilibrium from being reached. 
David (1985) believes that this can be illustrated by the QWERTY layout 
standard on keyboards, used instead of the more efficient Dvorak system. 
The first standard was an adaptive solution in the era of mechanical type-
writers, but with the advent of electric machines and later computers, 
the technical reason that justified the strange configuration of letters is 
no longer present, yet we are still stuck with the inferior solution, given 
the costs of learning a new configuration. In this case, market competition 
does not lead us to the optimal outcome.
We argue that this use of the model brings the CA nearer to Neoclassical 
10 Langlois, for instance, writes: “What all this suggests, of course, is that one must begin to 
theorize in explicitly evolutionary terms rather than to rely on optimization models as a “sum-
mary” of the results of the evolutionary process.” (Langlois 1994, p.34).
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economics, with its exclusive focus on Pareto efficiency, and pushes us 
away from the interest in adaptability found in both the CA in general and 
the Austrians. In fact, in Biology it is recognized that artificial selection 
in models is different from natural selection in nature. It is argued that 
evolution in the real world is hardly locked into a local maximum, if we 
consider other variables present in natural selection that are disregarded 
by the model. What may be a peak in one dimension of the fitness surface 
can be a gentle slope if we consider other dimensions, so that evolution 
can continue along another hillside (Ridley 1996, p. 219). Likewise, for 
the Austrians, a seemingly unassailable monopoly is rarely challenged by 
a firm that exactly replicates its activity: competition, seen as a process of 
discovery, is manifested through solutions that were not previously imag-
ined. Of course we never are in the best possible world —we would make 
different decisions if the past were different, but the Austrians are very 
skeptical about the ability of modelers and planners to ascertain which 
alternatives are better in a competitive system, whereas entrepreneurs 
have the liberty to test their opinions.
The difference between the two positions is of a methodological nature: a 
formal model determines and therefore limits what can be experienced. 
If the model is interpreted literally, one can easily conclude that evolution 
will cease. But, interpreted as something that simply shows the general 
principles of the workings of a learning mechanism, we can appreciate the 
ability of this mechanism to generate innovations. The first interpretation 
would only be realistic if the selective criteria were actually known in 
advance. That would happen if those criteria were consciously imposed, 
as in a hierarchical order (Hayekian taxis). But in a spontaneous order, 
such as the market, in which the profitability of a product depends on the 
evaluation of several consumers, the variables taken into account by these 
consumers are multiple, so that we cannot enumerate them a priori. As 
nobody could specify all the aspects of a product that may influence the 
choice of consumers, the scope for entrepreneurial novelty is greater than 
what can be modeled.
This difference is clear among biologists, who carefully distinguish be-
tween natural selection and artificial selection models. Dawkins (1997), 
in fact, argues that models that simulate natural selection by using genetic 
algorithms employ parameters that are necessarily arbitrary. The only pur-
pose of the model is to illustrate the principle of operation of the process, 
the complexity of which is much larger in nature. In nature, new solutions 
emerge that would never arise in the artificial selection model, because 
the dimensions that define what can be tried are not restricted a priori.
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Complexity Approach economists should pay attention to these method-
ological considerations, since the representation of a theory through for-
mal models that specify what can be taken into account by agents gener-
ates a tendency to model learning as an inductive process (Arthur 1994). 
In inductive learning, agents already know the model that correctly rep-
resents the structure of the world, differing only in their command of 
the sets of information that feed the model. This hinders the capability of 
market competition analysis to appreciate the importance of creativity, 
the discovery mechanism emphasized by Hayek, and paradoxically, the 
very complexity inherent in economic phenomena. 
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